Distributed Algorithm for Matching between Individuals and Activities by Morge, Maxime & Nongaillard, Antoine
Distributed Algorithm for Matching between
Individuals and Activities
Maxime Morge, Antoine Nongaillard
Univ. Lille, CNRS, Centrale Lille, UMR 9189 - CRIStAL
Centre de Recherche en Informatique Signal et Automatique de Lille, F-59000 Lille, France
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce an agent-based model for coalition formation which
is suitable for our usecase. We propose here two clearing-houses mechanisms.
The first aims at maximizing the global satisfaction of the individuals. The
second ensures that all individuals are assigned as much as possible to a pre-
ferred activity. Our experiments show that the outcome of our algorithms are
better than those obtained with the classical search/optimization techniques.
Moreover, their distribution speeds up their runtime.
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1. Introduction
Multiagent systems (MAS) is a relevant paradigm for the analysis, the design
and the implementation of systems composed of interacting autonomous entities.
In order to design socio-technical systems for mediation or simulation, MAS
allow to model the feedback loops between heterogeneous actors whose local
decision-making leads to complex global phenomena. One of the challenges of
the MAS community is to facilitate the elicitation of preferences.
Our work is part of a research project that aims to understand and model
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feedback dynamics that occur in a group interacting both in a social network
and a real social network. The usecase we focus here consists of seniors sharing
some activities. This scenario involves thousands of individuals. We aim at
maximizing the activities shared in order to improve the social cohesion and
avoid the isolation of seniors. We want to propose a social network such that
the users form groups to practice together some activities. The purpose of this
system is to suggest to each user people with whom to practice these activities.
In this paper, we present an agent-based model for coalition formation which
is suitable for our usecase. A set of individuals must be matched together in
order to share one of the activities with respect to the preferences of individuals
for their peers and for the activities. We define decision rules for the elicitation
of the individual and collective preferences with respect to the coalitions in
terms of economic efficiency, fairness, stability and social cohesion. Based on
the bilateral structure of the problem, we propose here two clearing houses
mechanisms which return some matchings where none activity is oversubscribed.
The first one, said ”selective”, aims at maximizing the global satisfaction of the
individuals. The second one, said ”inclusive”, ensures that all individuals are
assigned as much as possible to a preferred activity.
The agent-based modelling allows us to distribute the execution of these
algorithms which are described as agent behaviours. Our experiments show
that the outcomes reached are better than the outcome reached by mathematical
optimization or classical local search techniques. Moreover, the decentralization
speeds up the runtime (up to 5 times).
Section 2 motivates our approach and compares it with the related works.
We introduce our matching problem in Section 3. We propose two matching
algorithms in Section 4. The decentralization of these algorithms consists of
agent behaviours described in Section 5. Section 6 and Section 7 exhibit our
empirical results. Finally, we conclude with some directions for future work (cf
Section 8).
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2. Agent-based model of matching
Social choice theory aims at designing and analyzing collective decision-
making processes which imply a set of agents selecting or classifying a subset
of alternatives among the available ones. Contrary to Economy, Computer
science is concerned in this field by the study of algorithms in order to propose
operational methods. We focus here on a particular matching problem.
In order to illustrate our usecase, we present here a walk-through toy sce-
nario.
Example 1 (walk-through scenario). Four individuals (1, 2, 3 and 4) wants
to performs passing with one person and six juggling props. Having six clubs and
six balls, two activities are available: the clubs (a) and the balls (b). Each ac-
tivity can be performed by at most two individuals. According to the interests of
the individuals for the activities and their affinity for their peers (cf Fig.1), all
the individuals prefer passing clubs rather than balls but not with anyone. If 1
and 2 like each other, it is not the case for all of them. For instance, we will see
in this paper that 3 and 4 like passing each other clubs but they prefer staying
alone rather than passing balls each other. Beyond the combinatorics of such a
problem (63 matching in our toy example), the search of a harmonious outcome
is a complex system.
In the problem of hedonic coalition formation, which has been formalized
in [1], each player is endowed with a single preference relation over all the
coalitions which contain this player. Our problem is a specialization of the
hedonic coalition problem. We can represent our problem as a hedonic game.
Therefore, the preferences are not additively separable as in [2], but it requires
the generation of rational lists for coalitions (RLC) [3]. Conversely, the succint
representation of the individual preferences (the preferences over the activities
and over the peers are independent) and the two-sided structure of our problem,
i.e. the fact that the activities are focal points [4], allows us to provide tractable
clearing-houses mechanisms.
3
a b
v1 .50 .25
v2 .50 .25
v3 .50 .25
v3 .50 .25
j = 1 2 3 4
w1(j) 1.0 −0.5 −1.0
w2(j) 1.0 0.5 −1.0
w3(j) 1.0 0.5 −1.0
w4(j) 1.0 1.0 −1.0
aD1 b
aD2 b
aD3 b
aD4 b
{2, 1} 1 {1} 1 {3, 1} 1 {4, 1}
{1, 2} 2 {3, 2} 2 {2} 2 {4, 2}
{1, 3} 3 {2, 3} 3 {3} 3 {4, 3}
{1, 4} 4 {2, 4} 4 {4} 4 {3, 4}
Figure 1: Cardinal preferences (at top) and the deduced ordinal preferences (at bot-
tom) of the individuals over the activities (at left) and the peers (at right) as stated
in Section 3.
The problem of group activity selection has been proposed in [5]. Each
player participates in at most one activity and its preferences over activities
depend on the number of participants in the activity. This is a generalization
of anonymous hedonic games. This problem has been extended [6] in order to
take into account the relationships among the agents, the latter are encoded by
a social network, i.e. an undirected graph where nodes correspond to agents
and edges represent communication links between them. By contrast, in our
problem, each individual is endowed with a preference relation over the activities
and a preference relation over its peers.
The Hospital/Resident (HR) problem has been introduced in [7]. This prob-
lem is a specialization of the coalition formation game where a set of residents
must be assigned to the hospitals in accordance with the preferences of the
residents over the hospitals and the preferences of hospitals over the residents.
The HR problem has many extensions [8]. To the best of our knowledge, no
extension is suitable for our usecase.
How does an agent evaluate its preferences? In order to reduce the users’
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effort for preference elicitation, we adopt here utility functions (cardinal pref-
erences). Moreover, we assume some additively separable preferences and that
the evaluation of activities and individuals are comparable. Even if their expres-
siveness is limited, the representation of our preferences is linear with respect
to the number of individuals/activities.
What is the “best” solution for collective decision-making problem? In the
literature, two kinds of rules derive the social choice from the individual prefer-
ences: the first ones are based on the desirable properties of the solution (e.g.
stability or economic efficiency), while the latter are based on the aggregation
of the individual preferences (i.e. social welfare), we consider here these two
approaches.
How to reach a matching which maximizes the social welfare? It has been
shown in [9] that DCOP (Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem) al-
gorithms are not necessarily scalable for matching problems. We will see in
this paper that mathematical optimization and local search techniques are not
suitable here since the objective function consists of many local optima. That
is the reason why we adopt a multiagent approach, in particular a multi-level
model as recommended by [10] where each coalition agent represents a group of
individuals.
3. Matching between individuals and activities
We abstract away from our practical application to introduce a formal frame-
work for coalition formation which captures our usecase: the problem, the so-
lutions and their evaluation from an individual/collective viewpoint.
3.1. Preferences over individuals and activities
We introduce here the individuals/activities (IA) problem. In such a prob-
lem, the individuals selects their favorite activities with the partners they prefer.
Definition 1 (IA Problem). An individuals/activities (IA) problem of
size (m,n), such that m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 1, is a couple IA = 〈I, A〉 with m
individuals and n activities, where:
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• A = {a1, . . . , an} is a set of n activities. Each activity aj has a maximal
capacity cj ∈ N+ ;
• I = {1, . . . ,m} is a set of m individuals. Each individual i is endowed
with,
1. an interest function over the activities vi : A ∪ {θ} → [−1, 1]
2. an affinity function over the peers wi : I \ {i} → [−1, 1]
Intuitively, the void activity (denoted θ), which corresponds to do nothing, has
an infinite capacity : all the individuals can be assigned to it.
The interest/affinity functions allow to express the repulsion (< 0), the at-
traction (≥ 0), and eventually the indifference (0) of an individual with respect
to an activity/peer. By convention, the interest of an individual with respect
to the void activity is neutral:
∀i ∈ I vi(θ) = 0 (1)
We deduce from each interest function vi an individual preference relation
over the activities, i.e. a reflexive, complete and transitive preference ordering
over A ∪ {θ}. This preference relation (denoted Di) is defined such that:
∀i ∈ I ∀aj , ak ∈ A ∪ {θ} (vi(aj) ≥ vi(ak)⇒ aj Di ak) (2)
The corresponding strict relation is denoted Bi.
In order to evaluate the satisfaction of an individual i to belong to a group g,
we extend his affinity function over all the groups to which he belongs, denoted
G(i) = {g ⊆ I | i ∈ g}. Thus, the satisfaction for a individual to belong to
a group only depends on its peers in this group and not on the other groups
formed by the remaining individuals. In other words, preferences over groups
are purely hedonic preferences. For now, we abstractly define the affinity of an
individual i for a group in the following way:
wi : G(i)→ [−1, 1]
∀i ∈ I ∀g ∈ G(i) wi(g) = }j∈g\{i} wi(j) (3)
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This affinity, which is normalized (wi(g) ∈ [1.1]), evaluates the preferences of
an individual over 2m−1 groups. The affinity function will be instancied in
Section 6.
We deduce from each affinity function wi a preference relation over the
groups of peers, i.e. a reflexive, complete and transitive preference ordering
over G(i). This preference relation (denoted %i) is defined such that:
∀i ∈ I ∀g, g′ ∈ G(i) (wi(g) ≥ wi(g′)⇒ g %i g′) (4)
The corresponding strict relation is denoted i and the equivalence one ∼i.
The satisfaction of an individual i to belong to a group g for practice an
activity a depends on: (i) his or her interest in the activity; (ii) his affinity with
the group. For now, we abstractly define the utility function in the following
manner:
ui : G(i)×A ∪ {θ} → [−1, 1]
∀i ∈ I ∀g ∈ G(i) ∀a ∈ A ∪ {θ}, ui(g, a) = wi(g)⊕ vi(a) (5)
We assume that the utility is normalized (ui(g, a) ∈ [−1, 1]). The utility function
will be instancied in Section 6.
In the rest of the paper, we do not consider that the utilities are deduced
from ordinal preferences as in [11] but we suppose a direct access to the utilities
of agents since it is the case in our practical application (e.g. the preferences
depicted in Fig. 1).
3.2. Matching
We can now define the possible solutions for the matching problem previously
presented.
We aim at forming coalitions of individuals around the activities.
Definition 2 (Coalition). A coalition is a couple C = 〈a, g〉 where a ∈ A ∪
{θ} and g ⊆ I. The capacity of the coalition (denoted cC) corresponds to the
capacity of the activity (denoted aC) if aC ∈ A and 1 otherwise. The size of the
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coalition is the cardinality of the group (denoted gC). A coalition is said sound
if the size does not exceed its capability: card(gC) ≤ cC . A non-empty coalition
C is such that gC 6= ∅. C is for i if i ∈ gC .
We consider a problem instance such that the number of individuals is con-
siderably larger than the number of available activities (m >> n) as in our
practical application.
Definition 3 (Matching). A matching M is represented by the functions
aM : I → A ∪ {θ} and gM : I → P(I) such that:
∀i ∈ I, aM (i) ∈ A ∪ {θ} (6)
∀i ∈ I, i ∈ gM (i) ⊆ I (7)
∀i ∈ I, aM (i) = θ ⇒ gM (i) = {i} (8)
∀i ∈ I ∀j ∈ gM (i), aM (j) = aM (i) (9)
∀i ∈ I ∀j ∈ I \ {i}, aM (i) = aM (j) 6= θ ⇒ gM (i) = gM (j) (10)
The assignment of an individual is an activity, possibly the void activity (cf
equation 6). In this case, the individual is said inactive. Each individual is
associated with the group it belongs (cf equation 7). All the individuals which
are assigned to the void activity are alone (cf equation 8). All the individuals
which are associated with each others have the same activity (cf equation 9) and
reciprocally all the individuals which are assigned to the same activity, excepted
the void activity, are associated with each other (cf equation 10).
In a matching M , the participation function determines the set of individ-
uals who practice an activity:
pM : A ∪ {θ} → P(I)
pM (a) = {i ∈ I | aM (i) = a} (11)
The set of participants for an activity can be empty. If aM (i) = θ, i is said
inactive. In a matching M , an activity a ∈ A ∪ {θ} is:
1. oversubscribed card(pM (a)) > ca ;
2. undersubscribed card(pM (a)) < ca ;
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3. full (denoted fullM (a)) otherwise.
A matching is said sound if no activity is oversubscribed.
A matching M is a coalition structure, i.e. a partition of individuals:
∀a ∈ A ∪ {θ}, 〈a, pM (a)〉 is a coalition (12)⋃
a∈A∪{θ}
pM (a) = I (13)
∀ai ∈ A ∪ {θ} ∀aj ∈ A ∪ {θ} \ {ai},
pM (ai) ∩ pM (aj) = ∅ (14)
Indeed, the equations 12, 13 and 14 are deduced from the equation 11, the
definition 2 and the definition 3. We denote CM (i) the coalition in M which
contains i. In order to simplify the definitions about stability in the next section,
we introduce the target function which returns the newcomers by selecting the
activity a in the matching M :
oM : A ∪ {θ} → P(i)
oM (a) =
pM (a) if a ∈ A,∅ otherwise. (15)
3.3. Individual rationality
We can now evaluate the satisfaction of the individuals with respect to the
possible solutions.
Each individual assesses the coalition to which he belongs and thus the
matching based on his group and his activity. An individual i considers that
a sound coalition C for him (i ∈ gC) is individually rational if and only if
ui(gC , aC) ≥ 0. A sound matching M is individually rational (denoted IR)
if and only if:
∀i ∈ I, ui(gM (i), aM (i)) ≥ 0 (16)
The existence of a sound IR matching is guaranteed, e.g. the trivial matching
(denoted M0) where all individuals are inactive.
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We deduce from each utility function ui an individual preference relation
over the coalitions, i.e. a reflexive, complete and transitive preference ordering
over A∪{θ}×G(I). The individual i prefers C rather than C ′ (denoted C %i C ′)
if ui(gC , aC) ≥ ui(gC′ , aC′). An individual prefers a matching to another one if
he prefers his coalition in the first. Let us consider M and M ′ two matchings for
our problem instance IA. The individual i prefers M rather than M ′ (denoted
M %i M ′) if and only if
CM (i) %i CM ′(i) (17)
The strict preference relation over the matchings/coalitions is denoted i.
Example 2 (Rationality). Let us consider the IA problem depicted in Fig. 1,
we focus on 3 of 63 possible sound matchings:
• M0 with pM0(a) = ∅, pM0(b) = ∅ and pM0(θ) = {1, 2, 3, 4};
• M1 with pM1(a) = {1, 2}, pM1(b) = {4} and pM1(θ) = {3};
• M2 with pM2(a) = {1, 2}, pM2(b) = {3, 4} and pM2(θ) = ∅;
Contrary to M0 and M1, M2 is not individually rational since the sound match-
ing 〈b, {3, 4}〉 is neither rational for 3, nor for 4. These two individuals strictly
prefer being inactve rather than being poorly accompanied for b. By contrast,
they strictly prefer practice a together rather than being inactive:
〈a, {3, 4}〉 3 〈θ, {3}〉 3 〈b, {3, 4}〉 (18)
〈a, {3, 4}〉 4 〈θ, {4}〉 4 〈b, {3, 4}〉 (19)
3.4. Social evaluation
We can now evaluate the matchings from the collective viewpoint.
A first desirable property for matchings is stability. Intuitively, the individ-
uals in a blocking coalition would like to separate and form their own coalition,
which makes the underlying matching unstable.
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A non-empty sound coalition C strongly blocks a matching M if and only
if all the individuals of the coalition strictly prefer the latter to be assigned
according to M :
∀i ∈ gC , C i CM (i) (20)
A sound matching is core stable (CS) if and only if no non-empty sound
coalition which strongly blocks it. By definition, a matching which is core
stable is individually rational.
A non-empty sound coalition C weakly blocks a matching M if and only
if all the individuals of the coalition prefer the latter to be assigned according
to M and at least one individuals strictly prefers the coalition:
∀i ∈ gC , C %i CM (i) ∧ ∃i ∈ gC , C i CM (i) (21)
A sound matching is strict core stable (SCS) if no non-empty sound coalition
strongly blocks it. By definition, all the SCS matching are a fortiori CS.
A sound matching M est Nash stable (NS) if and only if no individual can
benefit by moving from its coalition toward another undersubscribed activity:
∀i ∈ I ∀a ∈ A ∪ {θ} \ {aM (i)}
fullM (a) ∨ CM (i) %i 〈a, oM (a) ∪ {i}〉
(22)
Such a matching is immune to individual movements since the coalitions are
rational for all the individuals and at least as good as the other coalitions which
can be reached by a single move.
A sound matching M is individually stable (IS) if and only if no individual
can benefit by moving from his coalition to another undersubscribed activity or
if so, the deviating individual is not unanimously appreciated by his newcomers
partners:
∀i ∈ I ∀a ∈ A ∪ {a} \ {aM (i)}
fullM (a)
∨[〈a, oM (a) ∪ {i}〉 i CM (i)⇒
∃j ∈ oM (a), CM (j) j 〈a, oM (a) ∪ {i}〉
]
(23)
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By definition, a matching IS is a fortiori NS.
A sound matching M is contractually individually stable (CIS) if and
only if no individual can benefit by moving from his coalition to another without
decreasing the satisfaction of one side or the other:
∀i ∈ I ∀a ∈ A ∪ {a} \ {aM (i)}
fullM (a)
∨[〈a, oM (a) ∪ {i}〉 i CM (i)⇒
∃j ∈ oM (a), CM (j) j 〈a, oM (a) ∪ {i}〉
∨ ∃j′ ∈ gM (i) \ {i} , CM (i) j′ 〈aM (i), gM (i) \ {i}〉
]
(24)
By definition, a CIS matching is a fortiori IS. It worth noticing that, contrary
to a IS matching, a CIS matching is not necessarily IR.
We are now defining other desirable properties to evaluate the economic
efficiency of a matching. Like the previous ones, theses properties are not based
on inter-personal comparisons.
A sound M is perfect (P) if the coalition for each individual is one of his
preferred one:
∀i ∈ I ∀a ∈ A ∪ {θ} ∀g ∈ G(i), CM (i) %i 〈a, g〉 (25)
A matching M ′ Pareto-dominates M if and only if M ′ is strictly preferred
to M for at least one individual and not worst for the others:
∃i ∈ I, CM ′(i) i CM (i) (26)
∧ ∀i ∈ I, CM ′(i) %i CM (i) (27)
A matching is Pareto-optimal (PO) if it is not Pareto-dominated. In other
words, A matching is PO if there is no alternative in which all agents would be
in an equivalent or better position.
The strict core stability is a sufficient condition for the Pareto-optimality.
Property 1 (Efficiency vs. Stability). SCS ⊆ PO
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Proof 1 (Efficiency vs. Stability). We prove by contradiction that a sound
matching which is strict core stable is also Pareto-optimal. We assume that M is
a strict core stable matching which is not a Pareto-optimum. Then, there exists
a matching M ′ which Pareto-dominates M . Let us consider the coalition CM ′(i)
with i satisfying the equations 27 and 27. The equation 21 is true. Therefore,
we conclude that CM ′(i) is sound and weakly blocks M . This is in contradiction
with our assumption.
Contrary to the Paretian approach, the social choice theory analyses the in-
terpersonal comparisons [12]. This theory reconciles the utilitarianism of Jeremy
Bentham and the distributive justice advocated by John Rawls [13].
Definition 4 (Social welfare). Let M be a sound matching.
• The utilitarian welfare of M is:
U(M) =
1
m
∑
i∈I
ui(gM (i), aM (i)) (28)
• The egalitarian welfare of M is:
E(M) = min
i∈I
(ui(gM (i), aM (i))) (29)
The welfares are normalized (U(M), E(M) ∈ [−1, 1]). The higher the welfare is,
the better the matching is. A maximum utilitarian (respectively maximum
egalitarian) - denoted MaxUtil (respectively MaxEgal)- matching maximizes
the utilitarian (resp. egalitarian) welfare. It is worth noticing that, even all
the individuals/activities are attractive, the egalitarian welfare is 0 if at least
one individual is inactive. By definition, a sound MaxUtil matching is a fortiori
PO. Similarly, a sound MaxUtil matching is a fortiori IR.
Finally, Social Psychology points out that cohesion is more closely linked
to the interest of the activities rather than the interpersonal affinities [14].
Formally, a sound matching M is socially cohesive (SC) if and only if all
13
P(0)
SCS(0)NS(7)MaxEgal
(2)SC(6) MaxUtil(2)
IS(9) CS(0) PO(15)
CIS(16)IR(51)
Figure 2: Inclusive relationships between stability, optimality, fairness and social co-
hesion. The existence of the underlined concepts is guaranteed. The superscripts is
the distribution of teh 63 sound matching for our example (see figure 1) depending on
their properties.
individuals are assigned as much as possible to the activities they prefer:
∀i ∈ I
∀a ∈ {a ∈ A \ {aM (i)} | vi(a) ≥ 0 ∧ vi(a) > vi(aM (i))}
fullM (a)
(30)
The existence of a sound SC matching is guaranteed, e.g. the trivial matching
when all activities are rebutting. Inspired by our practical application which
aims at maximizing the activities shared (cf Section 7), this notion is orthogonal
to the previous ones.
Inspired by [2], Fig. 2 depicts the inclusion relationships between the previous
concepts as a lattice. For instance, the arc between SCS and PO indicates that
the first concept is a necessary condition for the second but not a sufficient one
as illustrated in the following example.
Example 3 (Social evaluation). Let us consider the IA problem represented
in Fig. 1, the sound MaxtUtil matching are :
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• M1 with pM1(a) = {1, 2}, pM1(b) = {4} and pM1(θ) = {3};
• M ′1 with pM ′1(a) = {1, 2}, pM ′1(b) = {3} and pM ′1(θ) = {4}.
The sound MaxEgal matching are:
• M3 with pM3(a) = {1, 4}, pM3(b) = {2, 3} and pM3(θ) = ∅;
• M ′3 with pM ′3(a) = {3, 4}, pM ′3(b) = {1, 2} and pM ′3(θ) = ∅.
The matchings M1 and M
′
1 are PO but not SCS. Contrary to M1 and M
′
1, the
matchings M3 and M
′
3 are SC but not IR.
In summary, if the stability is a desirable property, there is no necessarily
such a solution. Moreover, Pareto-optimality doesn’t seem to be discriminating
enough. By contrast, the concepts of social cohesion and social welfare are better
candidate to assess the quality of a matching from the collective viewpoint.
4. Centralized matching mechanism
Based on the bilateral structure of the IA problem, we propose here two
algorithms which return sound matchings.
Our algorithms are inspired by the student-proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm [7]. Each individual i is endowed with a list of concessions, i.e. ra-
tional activities in decreasing order of preference. On one side, the individual
i proposes itself to the activities he prefers, even if it must concede in case of
rejection. On the other side, the coalition 〈a, g〉, as a host, apply its capacity
constraint ca and the objective of the hosted individuals, i.e. a social decision
rule which can be:
• either a utilitarian rule
argmax
g
{
∑
i∈g
ui(g, a) | card(g) ≤ ca}, (31)
• or an egalitarian rule
argmax
g
{min
i∈g
ui(g, a) | card(g) ≤ ca}. (32)
15
The initial matching is the trivial one, i. e. all individuals are inactive. Each
in turn, a free individual i considers this prefers activity which attracts him a.
If the coalition is empty, i is assigned. Otherwise, the algorithms try to improve
the satisfaction of this coalition, eventually by excluding the individuals whose
presence penalizes the (utility or egalitarian) rule of the group. The individuals
who are excluded, eventually i, must concede and so consider the next attractive
activity.
In the selective algorithm,the social decision rule is evaluated for each
proposal to a non-emtpy group. As long as the capacity of a is not reached then
the group can grow. Finally, an individual who is rejected by all his attractive
activities is definitely inactive. Since a group of k individuals contains 2k − 1
non-emtpy subgroups, we propose an approximation algorithm which excludes
no more than one individual at each step.
Our (approximation) algorithm always returns a sound matching.
Property 2 (Termination). Our (approximation) algorithm applied over an
IA problem instance ends and returns a sound matching.
Proof 2 (Termination). We consider the following loop invariant: Σi∈I |concessions(i)|+
|free| with the list of the rational activities for i: concessions(i) and the set of
free individuals free. This invariant is positive. It strictly decreases after each
loop since:
1. an individual, which is assigned, is removed from Free;
2. an individual, which is not assigned, concedes until it is definitely assigned
to the void activity;
3. any individual, which is unassigned, concedes and at least one another
individual is assigned (and so removed from free).
The resulting matching is sound since the activities are never oversubscribed.
Example 4 (Selective algorithm.). Let us consider the IA problem repre-
sented in Fig. 1. Whatever the social decision rule is, our selective algorithm
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allows to reach M1 with pM1(a) = {1, 2}, pM1(b) = {4} and pM1(θ) = {3}. This
matching is Pareto-optimal but it is not socially cohesive.
It is worth noticing that the selective algorithm does not not necessarily
maximizes the utilitarian (respectively egalitarian) welfare by applying the util-
itarian (respectively egalitarian) rule since the individuals give priority to the
activities over the individuals. Despite this priority, the resulting matching is
not necessarily socially cohesive. That is the reason why we propose the inclu-
sive algorithm. In the latter, the social decision rule of a coalition, as a host, is
assessed only if its capacity constraint is violated and the exclusion of a single
individual is envisaged for each individual integration.
The inclusive algorithm always returns a sound match that is socially cohe-
sive whatever the social decision rule is.
Property 3 (Termination). The inclusive algorithm applied over an IA prob-
lem instance ends and returns a sound matching.
Proof 3 (Terminaison). See proof 2.
Property 4 (Social cohesion). The inclusive algorithm applied over an IA
problem instance returns a SC matching.
Proof 4 (Social cohesion). We prove by contradiction that the outcome M
of the inclusive algorithme is a SC matching. We assume that ther exists an
individual i and an activity a 6= aM (i) such that vi(a) ≥ 0, vi(a) > v(aM (i)) and
a is undersubscribed (cf equation 30). Since i is attracted by a, this individual
proposes himself to this activity which is in his list of concessions (line 4) before
a. He has been excluded by this activity which is full since the size of the possible
groups is ca (line 22). This is in contradiction with our assumption.
Example 5 (Inclusive algorithm). Let us consider the IA problem instance
depicts in Fig. 1. whatever the social decision rule is, the inclusive algorithm
allows to reach M2 with pM2(a) = {1, 2}, pM2(b) = {3, 4} and pM2(θ) = ∅. This
matching is socially cohesive but it is not individually rational.
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5. Agent behaviours
We describe here the previous matching mechanisms as agent behaviours in
order to decentralize their execution.
We consider the asynchronous message-passing model of actor for concurrent
programming introduced in [15]. In this framework, the primitives are agents
and events: an agent is an independent program that runs on its own processor;
an event corresponds to the creation of an agent or the utterance/reception of a
message. The system is distributed since the underlying channels are assumed
to be reliable (a message is delivered once and only once) and that the messages
may arrive in different order from sending.
In order to propose a distributed solver based on this model, we distinguish
3 kinds of agents:
1. the solver agent which creates the other agents and records the assign-
ments;
2. the individual agents which are endowed with the same behaviours but
with different preferences;
3. the activity agents which are endowed with the same behaviours but with
different capacity constraints and group objectives.
The behaviour of the solver agent consists of: i) creating other agents; ii)
triggering the solving; iii) recording the assignments/unassignments; and iv) re-
turning the matching when all the individual are assigned or definitely inactive.
Whether the mechanism is selective or inclusive, the behaviour of an indi-
vidual agent is the same. An individual agent proposes himself to his preferred
activity that attracts him. When the agent is assigned or excluded, he informs
the solver agent. For an unassignment, the coalition agent waits for a confir-
mation before sending a new proposal such that a matching is not prematurely
returned by the solver agent. If an individual agent becomes free, he concedes,
then he proposes himself to the next attractive activity until being definitely
inactive. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the reconfiguration of
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a coalition may be subject to arbitration by the the coalition agent that requires
the opinion of the individual agents which are concerned.
In order to describe the coalition agent behaviour, we consider the finite
state machine design pattern for concurrent programming with 3 states:
1. the inital Disposing state for proposal processing;
2. the Casting state where the opinion of individual agents are requested in
order to assess the group in conformance with the social decision rule;
3. the Firing state where the excluded individual agents are notified.
The state transitions between states are such as:
Event if conditions : actions.
They are triggered by an external event, e.g. the reception of a message. The
automaton is deterministic, i. e. the conditions of triggering of outgoing transi-
tions for the same state are mutually exclusive. This behavioral design pattern
allows to manage multi-party dialogues. The proposals received by a coalition
agent are processed each in turn, even if they are stashed to be evaluated later
on, but their acceptance/rejection depend on the opinion of the other agents
which are concerned.
For instance, Fig. 3 describes the behaviour of the agent representing the
coalition 〈a, g〉 for the selective mechanism. According to this behaviour, an
proposal from i which is received in the Disposing state is accepted if the
coalition is empty. Otherwise, the agent evaluates this proposal in the Casting
by selecting the non-empty group according to the capacity constraint and the
objective of the coalition, i.e. the social decision rule. Then, if the proposer
is not a member of the selected group, the proposal is rejected. Otherwise,
the proposal is accepted as soon as, if some members are excluded, the latter
confirm the notification of exclusion by the solver agent (in the Firing state).
In the other matching mechanisms, the behaviour of coalition agents is similar
with the exception of the conditions and actions for the outgoing transitions
of the Disposing state. For instance, the assessment of the coalition for the
inclusive mechanism takes place only when the capacity is reached.
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Figure 3: Behaviour of the agent representing the coalition 〈a, g〉 in the selective
mechanism without approximation. subgroups(g,min,max) returns the subgroups of
g such as the size is between min and max.
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6. Experiments
Our experiments1 aim at evaluating: i) the benefits of the structural prop-
erties of the problem for our mechanisms; ii) the quality of the outcomes ; and
iii) the speedup due to their distribution.
Our prototype ScaIA (https://github.com/maximemorge/ScaIA) has been
implemented with the Scala progamming language and the Akka toolkit (http:
//akka.io). The latter, which is based on the actor model [16], allows us to fill
the gap between the specification of our agent behaviours and their implemen-
tation.
Our mechanisms exploit the structure of the IA problem, which is, contrary
to the hedonic game, two-sided. In order to evaluate its benefit, we translate
an IA problem instance into:
1. a hedonic game by associating : i) one player for each activity such that all
the sound coalitions are equally preferred; and ii) one player for each in-
dividual whose preferences are deduced from the preferences of the latter.
Then, we compute a contractually individually stable (CIS) coalition;
2. a mixed integer quadratic programming (MIQP) problem (cf Appendix
A) which is solved with IBM R© ILOG R© CPLEX R©.
We consider some IA problem instances with 2 activities and m ∈ [2, 20] in-
dividuals. For the sake of simplicity, all activities have the same capacity
(c = dm/2e). We generate 100 (pseudo-)random instances for each value of
m.
First of all, we need to instanciate the definition of the affinity function
and the definition of the utility function. Inspired by our practical application,
we axiomatize the principle quo plus est eo hilarior, sed quo paucior eo melior
cibus2 by computing the affinity of an individual i for a group in the following
1Our experiments have been performed with a 8 core Intel (R) i7 2.8GHz and 16GB RAM.
2In English the more the merrier, but the fewer the better fare.
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way:
wi : G(i)→ [−1, 1]
∀i ∈ I ∀g ∈ G(i) wi(g) = 1
m− 1Σj∈g\{i} wi(j) (33)
This affinity, which is normalized (wi(g) ∈ [1.1]), increases with the size of the
group if i is attracted by all the members of the group. This function, which
evaluates the preferences of an individual over 2m−1 groups, is additively separa-
ble and so its representation is linear with respect to the number of individuals.
For the sake of simplicity, we define the utility function in the following manner:
ui : G(i)×A ∪ {θ} → [−1, 1]
∀i ∈ I ∀g ∈ G(i) ∀a ∈ A ∪ {θ}, ui(g, a) = wi(g)⊕ vi(a) (34)
Since wi(g), vi(a) ∈ [−1, 1], the utility is normalized (ui(g, a) ∈ [−1, 1]).
Figure 4 compares the utilitarian welfare reached by the selective algorithm
with approximation, the CIS algorithm and the MIQP one. Figures 5 and 6
compare the runtimes of these algorithms with a logarithmic time scale and by
distinguishing the runtime for the translation of: i) the IA problem in a hedo-
nic game or in a mathematical program; and (ii) the solution. The runtime of
our procedure benefits from the structural properties of the IA problem. More-
over, the CIS algorithm is penalized by the generation of RLC [3] which take
exponential space. Even if the selective mechanism does not always maximize
the utilitarian welfare computed by the MIQP, it is closed to. Moreover, the
selective mechanism is (25 times) faster (for 20 individuals).
Similarly, Figures 7 and 8 compare the runtimes and the egalitarian welfares
reached by the inclusive algorithm and the approximation algorithm (MIQP).
The egalitarian welfare reached by our algorithm is closed but better than the
one approximated by MIQP while being (120 times) faster (for 20 individuals).
Even if we do not have any theoretical results concerning the stability of the
outcome for the selective algorithm, Figure 9 shows that 95% of the outcomes
of the selective algorithm with approximation are PO and 96% of them are IR.
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Figure 4: Utilitarian welfares of the selective approximation algorithm, of the MIQP
solver and of the CIS solver.
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Figure 5: Runtimes of the selective algorithm with approximation and of the MIQP
solver.
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Figure 6: Runtimes of the selective algorithm with approximation and of the MIQP
solver.
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Figure 7: Egalitarian welfares of the inclusive algorithm and of the MIQP solver.
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Figure 8: Runtime of the inclusive algorithm and of the MIQP solver.
We can note than we restrict ourselves to n = 2 and m ≤ 13 since the decision
problem for the Pareto-optimality is not tractable.
Since the MIQP algorithms are not scalable, we have implemented a local
search algorithm [17] to be compared with our algorithm. This hill-climbing
algorithm, which starts with a sound and random matching (where all the indi-
viduals are assigned to an activity) and iteratively tries to improve the welfare.
Two matchings are neighbours if they are identical with an exception for one
individual which moves to another activity. If this new activity is full, then all
the swaps of individuals with the members of that activity are considered.
We consider some IA problem instances with n activities and m individuals.
For the sake of simplicity, all the activities have the same capacity (c = dm/ne).
Firstly, we focus on the utilitarian welfare of the outcome reached by the
selective mechanism with approximation.
We can compare the utilitarian welfare of the matching reached by our se-
lective algorithm with the one reached by local search. Fig. 10 shows the av-
erage utilitarian welfare of 100 problem instances for each set of parameters (
25
��
���
���
���
���
����
�� �� �� �� �� �� ��� ��� ��� ���
��
���
���
���
����
���
���
��
���������������������
����
Figure 9: Percentage of matchings computed by the selective algorithm with approxi-
mation which are Pareto-Optimal (PO) and individually rational (IR).
2 ≤ n ≤ 10 and 2 × n ≤ m ≤ 100). The selective mechanism overreaches the
local search. Indeed, the utilitarian welfare for a IA problem is a function with
many local optima.
We can compare the runtime of the centralized version of our selective algo-
rithm with the decentralized one. Fig. 11 shows the average runtime for each set
of parameters (with 2 ≤ n ≤ 10 and 2 × n ≤ m ≤ 400). While the centralized
algorithm is faster when the number of individuals is low (∼ 20), its runtime
quickly grows with the number of individuals (13 ms for 100 individuals and 10
activities) while the runtime of the distributed version is low (4 ms in the latter
case). Moreover, the runtime of the hill-climbing algorithm is too high to be
represented in Fig. 11 (170, 857 ms for 100 individuals and 10 activities). We
can expect a higher runtime if we adopt a local search method such as simulated
annealing without any warranty about the optimality of the outcome.
Secondly, we focus on the egalitarian welfare of the outcome reached by the
inclusive mechanism.
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Figure 10: Utilitarian welfare for the selective/hill-climbing algorithms.
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Figure 11: Runtime for the centralized/decentralized selective algorithms with approx-
imation.
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Figure 12: Egalitarian welfare for the inclusive/hill-climbing algorithms.
We can compare the egalitarian welfare of the matching reached by our
algorithm with the one reached by local search. Fig. 12 shows the average
egalitarian welfare of 100 problem instances for each set of parameters ( 2 ≤
n ≤ 10 and 2 × n ≤ m ≤ 100). The inclusive mechanism overreaches the local
search. Indeed, the egalitarian welfare for a IA problem is a function with many
local optima.
We can compare the runtime of the centralized version of our inclusive algo-
rithm with the decentralized one. Fig. 13 shows the average runtime for each set
of parameters (with 2 ≤ n ≤ 10 and 2 × n ≤ m ≤ 400). While the centralized
algorithm is faster when the number of individuals is low (∼ 40), its runtime
quickly grows with the number of individuals (7 ms for 100 individuals and 10
activities) while the runtime of the distributed version is low (2 ms in the latter
case). Moreover, the runtime of the hill-climbing algorithm is too high to be
represented in Fig. 13 (433, 496 ms for 100 individuals and 10 activities). We
can expect a higher runtime if we adopt a local search method such as simulated
annealing without any warranty about the optimality of the outcome.
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Figure 13: Runtime for the centralized/decentralized inclusive algorithms.
In summary, the outcomes reached by our algorithms seem to be closed to the
maximum utilitarian/egalitarian. Moreover, the distribution of our algorithms
allows to speedup its runtime.
7. Practical application
Our practical application is concerned with a group of seniors who aim at
sharing some holidays. The objective is to maximize the activities shared in
order to improve the social cohesion and avoid the isolation of seniors.
According to the figure 14, which represents the entity-relation model of our
database, each user is described by a set of features: gender, age, hobbies, etc.
Thus, each user indicates (or not) the values which characterize him and he
may inform its attraction/repulsion towards these values for his peers. From
this knowledge we compute the affinities between users. In a way similar, tours
are described by feature values on which users express some preferences. From
this knowledge, we compute the interests of the users for the tours.
29
Figure 14: Entity-relation model to capture the real-world data processed by our
matching algorithms. Entities are represented by rectangles and relations by rectangles
with rounded corners.
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Algorithm Welfare Runtime (ms)
Selec. with appr. U(M) = 0.154 263
Dis. selec. with appr. U(M) = 0.156 210
Hill-climbing U(M) = −0.066 49 116
Inclusive E(M) = 0.0 22
Dis. inclusive E(M) = 0.0 44
Hill-climbing E(M) = −0.433 20 643
Table 1: Welfares and runtimes of the matching algorithms with the real-world data.
Even if this scenario involves thousands of users, we have tested our proto-
type with 102 users and 10 tours. Table 1 summarizes the runtimes and welfares
reach by all the matching algorithms, except the ones based in mathematical
optimization which are too slow. Whether we focus on the utilitarian welfare
or the egalitarian one, our algorithms are faster and more efficient than hill-
climbing. The runtimes of the distributed versions of our algorithms are faster
when the number of individual integrations is sufficient.
8. Discussion
We have presented here a generic problem where some individuals must be
assigned to the activities they enjoy with their favorite partners. Even if stability
is desirable, it is not guaranteed. By contrast, Pareto-optimality seems not to
be discriminative. This is the reason why we evaluated a matching from the
collective viewpoint using concepts derived from social choice theory. Others
concepts may be relevant, whether they come from Economy (envy-freeness,
strategy-proofness, etc.) or inspired by social psychology such as the concept of
social cohesion sketched here.
Even if a worst-case study is required here, our experiments show that social
welfares are functions with many local optima. That is the reason why we
have proposed here two heuristics, one for each of the notions of social welfare.
31
They returns sound matchings in accordance with a social decision rule (either
utilitarian or egalitarian) for the first and which is socially cohesive for the
second. These mechanisms are based on the organizational aspect of agent-
based modelling by explicitly introducing an intermediate level between the
individual and the society, i.e. a coalitions of individuals who share a common
interest for an activity. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the
assessment of a coalition is performed by an agent representing the objectives
and constraints of a group of individuals.
Our empirical results, in particular with real-world data, illustrate that
multiagent resolution methods can be more effective than general optimization
methods which require problem reformulation. Beyond a simple decentraliza-
tion that, as here, speedups its runtime, the modeling of agents behaviours
allows to introduce a variety of strategies for implementing the constraints and
the objectives of the different agent coalitions.
In future works, we plan to take into account the relational aspect of the
agent-based modelling to distribute the negotiations between neighbours in the
social network.
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Appendix A. Linear programming
Let us consider a IA problem instance of size (m,n).
In order to find a maximum utilitarian matching, we can consider quadratic
programming, i. e. a method of optimization with a mathematical model that
can be represented by:
1. n×m decision variables xia ∈ {0, 1} such that,
xia =
1 if i is assigned to a,0 otherwise ; (A.1)
2. m constraints representing the mutual exclusion of individual assigne-
ments,
Σa∈Axia ≤ 1; (A.2)
3. n constraints for the soundness of the matching,
Σi∈Ixia ≤ ca. (A.3)
4. the objective function to maximize:
1
m
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈A
[
1
2
(
xiavi(a) +
1
m− 1
∑
j 6=i
xjawi(j)
)]
(A.4)
In order to find a maximum egalitarian matching, we can consider the fol-
lowing linear program:
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1. n×m decision variables xia ∈ [−1, 1] such that,
xia =
1 if i is assigned to a,0 otherwise ; (A.5)
2. a decision variable uMin ∈ [−1; 1] representing the minimal utility of
individuals;
3. m constraints representing the mutual exclusion of individual assigne-
ments,
Σa∈Axia ≤ 1; (A.6)
4. n constraints for the soundness of the matching,
Σi∈Ixia ≤ ca. (A.7)
5. m constraints for the minimal utilities of the individuals:∑
a∈A
[
1
2
(
xiavi(a) +
1
m− 1
∑
j 6=i
xjawi(j)
)]
≥ uMin (A.8)
6. the objective function to minimize: uMin.
This program allows to implement an approximation algorithm.
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